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Peace Challenges and the Moral Weapons of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro

Courir pour la paix : les armes morales des politiques de pacification à Rio de Janeiro
Carly Machado
p. 115-147

Résumés

Les politiques de « pacification » à Rio de Janeiro, initialement promues par le secrétaire d’État à la sécurité publique en 2008, ont pour objectif proclamé de « se rapproprier les territoires » sous le contrôle des factions criminelles. Dans la pratique, cela signifie l’occupation militaire des favelas et le contrôle de leurs populations. L’objectif principal de cet article est d’analyser le projet de pacification à Rio de Janeiro et ses multiples effets lors des huit dernières années, au-delà des pratiques de sécurité publique menées par les forces de l’ordre brésiliennes, et de proposer une réflexion sur les processus symboliques, moraux et culturels qui contribuent significativement à la légitimation des actions de pacification. Basé sur des enquêtes de terrain, cette contribution examine deux événements ayant fait l’objet d’une mise en scène dans la favela Complexo do Alemão six mois après son occupation : la course « Peace Challenge » et un concert de gospel. Ces deux événements révèlent que l’arsenal de la pacification est aussi fait d’« armes » morales qui, par des discours et des pratiques culturelles et religieuses, contribuent à façonner l’existence et les idées des populations ciblées par ces interventions. Il ressort de cette étude qu’un élément clé des politiques de pacification à Rio de Janeiro est le potentiel dissociatif des pratiques d’État qui, tout en influençant les relations sociales et les alliances dans les favelas pendant des décennies, ont un impact sur les stratégies créatives mobilisées par les résidants pour obtenir protection et résistance. Alors qu’on pourrait en conclure que la présence de l’État constitue un régime de protection pour les résidants, une recherche approfondie sur le long terme montre que la « dissociation » est un but en soi qui ne fait qu’accroître la vulnérabilité des populations.

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1In November 2010, the Brazilian army occupied two of the largest clusters of favelas in Rio de Janeiro as a strategic act under the Rio de Janeiro State Government’s « pacification policy » a policy first implemented in 2008 within the scope of its public security program. Located side-by-side, separated by a small hill, and covering large swathes of territory, Vila Cruzeiro and Complexo do Alemão had for many years been depicted in the Rio public imagination as areas « dominated » by violent crime. Their alleged dangerousness has meant that at various moments in recent history they have been the target of large-scale police and military interventions. During preparations for the global sporting events planned for 2014 and 2016 in Rio de Janeiro, these territories were once again the site of state actions of control and repression.

2According to official state government data1, Complexo do Alemão is composed of fifty communities, with an estimated population of sixty to seventy thousand2. Vila Cruzeiro has approximately seventeen thousand residents. Situated in the north of the city, these territories are located along the main access roads to the city centre, close to Rio de Janeiro’s international airport and the interstate bus station. Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro are also near the access road to the west of the city, where several major sports facilities are located, especially those that served for the Pan American Games (2007) and the Olympics (2016). With its large number of entry and exit points providing access to different parts of the city, the area is extremely difficult to control. The region is characterized by an irregular topography, alternating flat areas and higher elevations that form small hills.

3Three months after the army’s occupation of these strategic urban regions, in February 2011, the state government organized a gospel show in Complexo do Alemão as part of a public health campaign. This event drew a large audience, including residents of Alemão and outsiders, to a football pitch inside the favela. Among the organizers of the show was one of Brazil’s largest Ngos, the AfroReggae Cultural Group. It also received support from the foremost media company in Brazil, Rede Globo, and a leading Brazilian cosmetics company, Natura. The main attraction was a nationally acclaimed gospel band : Ministério de Louvor Diante do Trono ; throughout the performance, the entire area surrounding the football pitch was patrolled by army tanks and soldiers (Machado 2013).

4In May 2011, six months after the army occupation and three months after the Public Health Gospel Show, the first « Peace Challenge » was held. It was conceived as a 5 km run following a route linking Vila Cruzeiro and Complexo do Alemão. The Ngo responsible for organizing the Gospel show in February 2011, namely the AfroReggae Cultural Group, was also the organizer of the « Peace Challenge » run. The route the sports event followed was not unfamiliar to the Brazilian public as images of the Brazilian army’s occupation of these territories had been widely circulated by the mass media in all kinds of local, national and international news reports. However, the iconic image of the military forces’ entry into Vila Cruzeiro, the first of the two territories occupied in 2010, did not illustrate the operation’s triumphant conclusion but, in fact, showed helicopter footage of dozens of armed men, fleeing on foot along 5 km of dirt tracks winding across a small hill between Vila Cruzeiro and Complexo do Alemão.

5These images generated a problem : how could one legitimize a pacification operation, promoted as the State’s forces regaining control of territories from organized criminal groups, when thousands of Tv viewers had seen live reports of a group of armed men moving from one favela to another ? The response to the issues raised by this problematic image was the military occupation of Complexo do Alemão. As a result, the army remained in the Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro favelas for almost two years, until it was replaced by the State Military Police, via the installation of Police Pacification Units (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora, Upps).

6Another response to the images of the escape was the organization of the « Peace Challenge » run. The first race was publicized as a sports event commemorating « six months of peace » in Complexo do Alemão. Its course followed exactly the same route as that taken by the escaping gang members during the army occupation. Involving more than 1000 participants in 2011, the competition saw residents of the two favelas, athletes, artists, police officers and politicians from the Rio public stage, running alongside each other.

7In 2013, after the army had left the locality, « the third Peace Challenge » race was preceded by a shootout. Minutes before the start of the race, gunshots were heard, supposedly fired from Vila Cruzeiro. After a rapid risk assessment by the police, the event unfolded as planned, including once again Rio de Janeiro’s Secretary of Public Security, José Mariano Beltrame, the main driving force behind the State Government’s pacification policy.

8Taking the empirical material introduced here as my starting point, my objective in this article is to analyze the pacification policy currently implemented in the State of Rio de Janeiro. However, it will be examined, not solely through the actions of public security agents – the army and police – but by focusing particularly on situations and mediators like those described in this introduction. While these actors’ contributions are essential to the implementation of this policy they are rarely included in direct analyses of this process.

  • 3 Various studies have been undertaken in Rio de Janeiro on the pacification policy. I highlight the (...)

9Thinking about the production of pacification beyond the realm of public security does not entail ignoring questions relating to state actions, the process of militarization and the state violence that accompanies it3. I intend to combine this analysis with a reflection on the processes of legitimization involved in these practices of governance and control of populations. I will also analyze the transitions and interconnections between institutions, discourses and agents from a wide variety of fields of action, representation, practices and power, such as religion, market and culture. Here I shall argue that if there is a model of pacification to be conceived on the basis of the Rio experience, this model is not exclusive to the military and police. The challenge of pacification also gives rise to a symbolic and cultural model that mobilizes interpretations and practices of legitimation that sustain this apparatus, along with the weapons and diverse kinds of violence displayed within it.

Pacification and State Practices in Rio de Janeiro

10The pacification strategy involves different phases. In the initial stage of « occupation », state military forces enter the territories in a massive show of force, generally on an emblematic day, and perform an inaugural symbolic act of « retaking the territory ».

11Different favelas have experienced distinct models of « occupation ». Menezes (2015) and Esperança’s (2014) works reveal fairly diverse cases : Menezes analyses local narratives about « occupation » in two favelas in Rio de Janeiro, and its impacts on the sociability of their residents. They are caught in a process in which silence, doubts and fears generate a sense of the territory being a « minefield », both for the residents and the police officers who were involved in the implementation of Rio de Janeiro’s first Upps in 2008. Esperança (Ibid.) describes the « occupation » of Complexo do Alemão in 2010 in a very different way : as a performative event with the ostensive presence of the army and its warfare equipment, highly mediatized and widely broadcast by national and international Tv channels.

12The first phase of the occupation involves the temporary presence of ostensive military forces : special police battalions and, in some cases, the army itself, as in Complexo do Alemão. Army participation in these actions against crime in urban territories raises questions, not only among public opinion external to the situation, but also within the Army itself, concerning its institutional missions.

  • 4 See Tahiane Stochero, « Para Exército, ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que guerra e missão no Haiti », (...)

13The Army’s relationship to the public security forces (the police) is a sensitive topic. All the more so when the Army is asked to remain for a lengthy period in the urban territories, as was the case in Complexo do Alemão. While the Army had already conducted one-off ostensive occupations of territories at other moments in Rio de Janeiro’s history, its soldiers had never remained in these localities for as long as they did in Complexo do Alemão, where they ended up staying for about a year and a half. In a report entitled Para Exército ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que guerra e missão no Haiti (« The Army’s Occupation of Alemão is more difficult than the war and mission in Haiti »)4, those responsible for the Brazilian Army’s presence in Complexo do Alemão analyze the difficulties and challenges of this experience. « The biggest difficulty that we face here is taking action against Brazilians. It is different from other typical military operations where we have a defined and uniformed physical enemy. In urban conflicts we cannot see the enemy on the other side. The drug trafficker, the thief and the suspects are living amid the people » explains Colonel Vladimir Schubert Ferreira.

  • 5 On the Army’s period of occupation in Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro, see the works by Espera (...)

14Colonel Ferreira headed the troops in Complexo do Alemão for six months. This specific period, when the « pacified territories » continue to be occupied by army forces or special police units, marks a particular moment of the pacification project with its own realities and conflicts, vastly different from the later period when the Police Pacification Units (Upps) are deployed. The events described at the beginning of this article that serve as analyzers for my questions, took place precisely during this phase5.

15The phase following the « occupation » is therefore the deployment in the locality of Upps (one or more, depending on the size of the area to be covered), the military police who replace the special forces. The Upps team of police officers describes its function as « community policing » (polícia de proximidade)6.

16Hence in addition to formal policing practices like stop and search and surveillance of the territories, the pacification process develops « social » actions : the organization of events, school tutoring services, sports and music classes, among other activities frequently hosted within the space of the Upps themselves.

  • 7 An extensive literature in the Brazilian Social Sciences has made hard-hitting critiques of this mo (...)

17The choice of the localities to be occupied by the « pacifying » intervention in Rio de Janeiro is on one hand self-evident and on the other somewhat obscure. Despite being formulated as a security policy for the whole of Rio de Janeiro State, « pacification » is implemented solely in the city of Rio de Janeiro and its favelas, thus clearly defining the territories and populations considered « dangerous » under this policy7.

  • 8 The disappearance of the bricklayer Amarildo in the Rocinha favela in July 2013, who vanished after (...)

18The analysis developed here explores the reality of the Upps eight years after the beginning of the Program. From 2008 to the present, the practical effects of pacification have been numerous and extremely varied. Among the main impacts, we can highlight the diversity of residents’ experiences with the Upps in their local areas. Although some of the favela population emphasizes the advantages of the Upps presence, the vast majority reinforces criticisms of the ostensive presence of the military police in their territories, replicating violent models of intervention already institutionalized in Rio de Janeiro’s police culture. The denunciations of abuses, torture and even killings by policies officers belonging to the Upps are numerous and extremely consistent8.

19In an article on Rio’s pacification policy, Fridman (2014) analyses the production of the « dream of peace » in Rio de Janeiro. In his analysis, this « dream » is a conservative project that « like a magic trick […] casts its spell and drowned out all the other modalities of crime, as if it contained the principle for inaugurating a “new city”, one in which people could live without fear » (2014 : 613). This dream is clearly not the same for different sections of the population, especially if we consider the contrast between favela and « asphalt » residents (moradores da favela e do asfalto). For the former, this dream often becomes a nightmare.

20However, this formula is by no means a novelty in Brazil. The National Public Security Program with Citizenship (Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania, Pronasci), launched in July 2007 by the Ministry of Justice, was officially presented as a program for the « prevention, control and repression of criminality, acting on its sociocultural roots, as well as linking public security actions to social policies through the integration of federal, state and municipal levels »9.

  • 10 See Vladimir Platonow, « Programa Território de Paz será lançado no Complexo do Alemão » [http://me (...)

21At this time the « Peace Territories » Program was also formulated as one of Pronasci’s activities (Britto & Ferreira 2010). This program, as officially presented by the Federal Government10, was composed of different projects for confronting violence in poor territories : police training, activities with women in the targeted areas, as well as specific initiatives for young people. In 2008 the Peace Territories Program was implemented in Complexo do Alemão. We can therefore observe an impressive list of state actions in Complexo do Alemão over the last ten years : the police mega-operation of 2007 (described in detail later), the Peace Territories Program of 2008, and the Pacification Policy in 2010.

22Long before Pronasci, however, « pacification » strategies had already been part of Brazil’s history and its constitution as a nation through the control of « dangerous populations ». João Pacheco de Oliveira (2014) provides an analysis indispensable to any discussion of pacification as state urban intervention. Thinking comparatively about the use of the idea of « pacification » in relation to the Brazilian indigenous population in colonial times, and its application as an urban practice, he prompts us to consider how governance practices influence the production of the « other ». He also reminds us how « pacification » – a central concept of state administration that traverses five centuries from the early colonial period to republican Brazil – forms an essential part of the production of the idea of « nation », profoundly effective in the constitution of an imagined social unity crucial to this process.

23Following this overview, I wish to reconstruct the particularities of the events described above in order to explore how pacification is produced beyond the actions of the public security forces, albeit still connected to them, and its repercussions. Thinking about the pacification process via its performative, imaginative, symbolic and sensory dimensions reveals how « pacification » projects are not implemented by the state alone. They pass through a variety of social agents who invent and reinvent « pacifications » in their interface with official projects. Consequently, I propose considering pacification as a civic-military device that can serve a means of expanding the analysis of the actors and institutions involved in its actual realization.

The “Field” of Pacification as a Crossfire Experience

  • 11 The idea of mediation formulated by Latour (1997 [1979], 2001) proposes that the work of mediation, (...)

24The fieldwork informing the analysis of the two events described here was conducted over a period of almost four years (2010-2014) as part of the research project « Crime and religion : social mediators of the “pacification project” of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area ». Trying to understand the actions and actors involved in mediation11 in the context of the implementation of Rio’s pacification policy, I worked closely with three specific groups : a Pentecostal church in Rio, historically focused on « rescuing » those involved in criminal activities ; the gospel band of the Rio de Janeiro Military Police ; and a social project run conjointly by the Rio de Janeiro Civil Police and the AfroReggae Cultural Group. All these different groups will be described in greater detail where pertinent.

25The ethnographic research that I pursued over these four years was a multi-sited project (Marcus 1995) that also involved my accompanying actors whose activities were rarely located in one specific place. These interactions taught me about the connections and disruptions between diverse actors in the social arena defined by pacification in Rio, and how their actions – sometimes in unison, at other moments in conflict – were significant elements of the pacification process as a moral intervention. As an analytical strategy for working with this complex and interconnected material, I decided to focus on specific « social situations » (as discussed by Gluckman 1986), urban situations and webs (Agier 2011 [2009]), and critical events (Das 1995), as methodological attempts to interconnect a long-term ethnographic project with various different groups. This allowed me to discuss the field as a process and to analyze its complexity. Over the course of these interactions I discovered the « Peace Challenge » run and the Gospel Show analyzed here. In both cases, some of these groups took an active part in the organization of the events.

26Another key aspect of my ethnographic research was the media material produced on the pacification project, along with the media artifacts created by and about the three groups I was following. In addition to my attempt to think about pacification as a cultural, symbolic and moral process, I also turned to the anthropology of media (Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod & Larkin 2002) as a source of other methodological approaches. Hence my ethnography was produced not just through the experience of spending time in the company of these actors on the ground, but also by keeping tabs on their media productions, listening to Cds, watching Tv shows and church videos of criminal gang members being « rescued », and religious services held in jails. The « voice » of my informants was not just the one I heard in face-to-face situations, but it included their media messages, expressions and performances.

27The complexity of the situations I encountered in this mode of fieldwork explains why I have named this section a « crossfire » experience. Spending time with different organizations afforded me a privileged vantage point to better understand their experiences and the meaning of specific conflicts involving the wider political arena. Conflicts and severe dissension arose between the church and the Ngo I was researching simultaneously, and also between the Ngo and the police group I was following. Some of these conflicts were public, but my proximity to them allowed me deeper insights. Others were only visible from an intimate viewpoint, but were fundamental to the macro analysis I was conducting. Although these situations were awkward to manage, crucially they also allowed me to reflect on the relationships possible between these very diverse social actors, as well as their limits – dimensions that only time would reveal.

28Throughout this text, I will show how this « crossfire experience » became not just a part of my ethnographic practice, but an important analytical tool to understand the production of local conflicts as a relevant effect of the so called actions of « pacification » on the researched territories and groups.

29Ultimately it is worth pointing out that all the groups I chose to follow were controversial actors in Rio’s public space. The pastor was prosecuted for rape and association with drug trafficking ; during my fieldwork he was convicted of the former crime and spent some months in jail. The leader of the Ngo is frequently accused of playing too much to the media and was more recently also declared a « traitor » : someone who was thrust into the limelight because of his relationship with the favela population, but who is now increasingly close to the state and the police forces, helping further their purposes. And finally, for a significant proportion of the Brazilian population, police officers are actors who, far from preventing violence, are among its main instigators. Hence their attempts to depict themselves as open-minded state agents who like to « chat », or messengers of the Christian words of love and peace propagated through gospel music, are highly controversial to say the least. The analytical potential of religious public controversies, as discussed by Montero (2015) and Giumbelli (2014), helped frame some aspects of the issues I was facing : these controversies gave me an understanding of the disputes between groups, the contexts in which they arise and are resolved, the alliances and ruptures they engender and the consequences they give rise to.

Peace Projects and Citizenship : Redesigning the “Pacified” City and the “Right to Come and Go”

30The « Peace Challenge » race is a good case for analysis as it connects the pacification project to aspects of the sporting world that may initially appear to be no more than government publicity strategies. I will start by highlighting the role of Ngos in the Rio de Janeiro pacification project. For many years, and especially from the 90s onwards, Rio’s favelas have been the target of civil society strategies for preventing violence. Consequently they have been occupied by non-governmental institutions and other organized collectives. Social and cultural projects run by civil society groups form part of the dynamics of poor territories in Rio de Janeiro and these are frequently listed among the principal strategies for confronting violence in the state.

31The engagement of organized civil society collectives in promoting peace was analyzed by Márcia Pereira Leite at the start of the 2000s. At that time, she emphasized how these groups fostered the production of « alternative meanings of citizenship and politics through the valorization of the idea of solidarity and commitment to the idea of peace » (2000 : 84). The author emphasizes the formation of networks of solidarity, focusing more on the citizen’s duties rather than his or her rights, promoting multiple forms of social participation and a model of citizenship grounded in fraternity and civic actions with a strong moral component, as ways of responding to social conflicts and promoting peace.

32Writing about these « multiple actions and projects aimed at recuperating solidarity among citizens », implemented at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, as well as their relation to the State, Leite (Ibid.) argues that, promoted by various agents, these projects rarely drew any original inspiration, strength or drive from the state. Instead they revealed a strategic choice in favor of active citizenship, working to complement state action or counteract the inertia of the latter.

33More than fifteen years after the political period analyzed by Leite, we can observe that this citizenship project, based on civil society, evolved during the 2000s into a variety of practices. While some of these initiatives remained a field of questioning and denouncing state practices (such as those analyzed in Leite & Birman [2004]), others aligned their projects with State policies, becoming the latter’s « social » and « cultural » face. Moreira’s (2014) and Pedro & Moreira’s (2015) works discuss how the practices of civil society organizations over the last forty years in Brazil have shifted, in the authors’ words, from the « territory of possibilities and utopias to the field of denunciations and deviations » (Pedro & Moreira 2015 : 1400). AfroReggae provides a clear example for the discussion I wish to advance here.

34The Ngo AfroReggae was born out of the « Vigário Geral Slaughter », which took place in 1993 in Rio de Janeiro : the favela was invaded by an extermination group of about thirty-six hooded and armed men, who broke into homes and executed twenty-one residents. Fifty-two military police were accused of the crime. Only six were sentenced.

35Today AfroReggae Cultural Group is active in various Rio favelas and describes its institutional mission as « promoting justice and inclusion through Afro-Brazilian art, culture and education, building bridges that unite differences and provide the foundations for sustainability and citizenship »12. Over its first decade of work, AfroReggae gradually consolidated its role as a mediator in the relations between warring factions in some of Rio’s favelas. Its leaders dialogued with criminal groups in order to enable negotiations over everyday life, specifically the interactions between residents and criminal factions. The entity offered to work as a mediator between the favela populations and state representatives, and its main leader and ambassador – José Junior – achieved the status of conflict mediator in prisons and favelas across Rio de Janeiro.

36Over the last ten years, though, a change has been noticeable in the positions and projects adopted by the Ngo. Increasingly linked to the Rio de Janeiro State Government, AfroReggae’s projects have become the government’s social face over a wide range of fields : health, employment and income, as well as public security. The latter undoubtedly served as the main channel of negotiation between the Ngo and the state government. Diverse projects run by the AfroReggae Cultural Group are today promoted in partnership with Rio’s police institutions, seeking to improve relations between these police forces and the favela population in particular and Brazil’s populations in general.

37Examples of these actions include the « Papo de Responsa » and « Papo de Polícia » projects, both studied in this research. The « Papo de Responsa » or « Responsible Chat » social project run by the AfroReggae in conjunction with the Rio de Janeiro Civil Police, brought together police officers and former drug dealers in a « chat » targeting the youth. The initiative opened up a channel of communication between police officers and a section of the Rio population that usually lives in fear of them, and demonstrated the « reality of drugs » through the life stories of past gang members who had suffered the consequences. I attended some of these « chat » sessions held at schools and universities, and also accompanied some of the police officers to or from these meetings. Initially held at schools, the project developed into a Tv program called « Papo de Polícia », or « Police Chat », the first season of which was filmed in Complexo do Alemão some months after its occupation. It presented the everyday life of a police officer in the favela and his relationship with local residents.

  • 13 Stating that the image of Rio’s civil police is « less » associated with violence in no way implies (...)

38I discovered the « Peace Challenge » run thanks to this particular police officer who appeared on the Tv show, and was himself the creator of the « Responsible Chat » project. He was the face of the police on AfroReggae’s team, the perfect example of the « peaceful police officer » depicted in the publicity for the event. The idea of « peace » linked to the image of this member of the civil police – in service in the field during the occupation of Alemão – successfully challenged the violent image of the military police13. Not directly related to policing on the streets, the civil police are primarily responsible for criminal investigations and less associated with violence, than the military police. A civil police officer had a better chance of presenting a « soft image » of « peaceful » law enforcement as he himself was not engaged in « pacification » like the officers from the Upp project run by the military police.

39Among the different events I attended in 2011 with police officers from the « Papo de Responsa » project, one in particular stood out : a meeting with Padma Santen, a Brazilian Buddhist lama. After a lecture given by the Lama, he and the police officer heading the « Chat » project engaged in a conversation that eventually turned to the role of police in society, comparing the police officer to a « samurai », a « peace warrior ». Symbolic connections between the actions of police officers and samurais were built up through ideas such as service, discipline, loyalty, protection, the samurai code of ethics (« the way of the warrior ») and honor.

40The leader of the AfroReggae Cultural Group also lays claim to a sort of « orientalism », with references to his « Hindu philosophy » of life and the importance of peace or shanti as a value. José Junior frequently links AfroReggae practices with what he calls the « Shiva effect », explaining that Shiva is a « Hindu God who destroys to enable the force of new constructions ». These discussions about the meaning of « peace », including many references to concepts taken from Eastern religions, were frequent between the two leaders of these strategic projects : « Papo de Responsa » and « AfroReggae ».

41The « Peace Challenge » proposal was not only based on state government marketing strategies (one of the obvious aspects of this event), it can also be traced back to these discussions, expressing the idea of peace as an « inner state » that can be attained by every individual, willing to work from within. Chatting to or running alongside former enemies are presented as starting points on this path.

42It is important to emphasize that a relationship between police officers and former criminal gang members, in which each side exchanged experiences and « hung out » with the other – as enabled by the « Papo de Responsa » project – was no easy task for any of those involved. Nonetheless these initiatives did bring representatives of these enemy groups together for a while. But despite the considerable visibility the civil police project enjoyed due to AfroReggae’s media expertise, and the closer relations AfroReggae developed with the State by working with its police forces in everyday activities, something more was needed to enhance the viability of this project. The idea of « peace » as an inner state attainable by anyone with a « strong will » was, therefore, for both sides, a key aspect of this uncomfortable alliance.

  • 14 Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police’s Special Operations Battalion (Bope).

43The « Peace Challenge » run held in Complexo do Alemão was advertised as bringing together different social groups in celebration of the « peace » achieved by the public security operation in the territory. The race would demonstrate the « right to come and go » inside the supposedly liberated Complexo do Alemão. In practice, despite the presence of some sports personalities and artists, the main protagonists of the event were not favela residents but members of the police forces who were able to race through a territory usually inaccessible to them. Bope14 officers, Upp police officers and civil police groups ran in separately organized « squads », all wearing the same T-shirts with their specific force’s symbol, almost as though they were on a military parade. Most of the residents, on the other hand, were mere witnesses to this spectacle of occupation.

44Where the drug traffickers previously held sway, today the police wield power. Far from being a model where the « freedom to come and go » prevails, the urban pacification project still produces a concept of favelas as controlled territories. And these models of governance eagerly try to silence the voices of the residents and their demands, and to limit their movements. Indeed the format designed for the « Peace Challenge » run made its goals abundantly clear : the circulation of people promoted during the sports event was one-way only : from the « city », or the asfalto, into the favela. City citizens, their culture – represented by outsider artists – and state forces could now safely enter, circulate in and occupy the favela. Residents were to stay where they were, under control.

Religion and Culture : Other Weapons of Pacification

45Over the last twenty years in particular, actors from Brazil’s religious sphere have cemented their role as mediators between the world of crime and the world of citizenship15. The many Evangelical churches located on the outskirts of Brazilian cities, especially in Rio and São Paulo, have become increasingly prominent in the debates on interventions in the world of crime. Over this period the Evangelical churches have developed a very specific repertoire for tackling violence. It ranges from devotional practices focused on the « spiritual battle » against crime, to an intense evangelization of imprisoned criminals, or direct negotiations with criminal gang leaders in order to convince them to release « bandits » condemned to death by « drug gang courts ». They are subsequently welcomed into the church. These practices have gained ground in Brazilian society and acquired national recognition through the numerous television programs on the actions of evangelical pastors in « combating violence » in Rio de Janeiro. There are popular documentaries on this subject (Dancing with the Devil, 2008)16, famous videos on these churches’ activities in the favelas with a high number of views on YouTube, and political recognition of the churches’ contribution, in the form of awards and medals, among other examples.

46The relationship between Pentecostalism and violent contexts in Brazil’s urban peripheries has been analyzed in major studies on religion and urban life. These works point to the role churches play in attenuating the « vulnerability » experienced in Brazil’s metropolises. They also discuss the relationship between the Evangelical world and territories of poverty, as well as the issue of violence and crime in the country at a more general level (Birman 2012 ; Almeida & D’Andrea 2004 ; Mafra 2011 ; Almeida 2011 ; Vital da Cunha 2009 ; Mesquita 2009 ; Birman & Machado 2012 ; Machado 2014, among others).

47Pursuing this line of questioning, from 2010 to 2014 I studied the Assembléia de Deus dos Últimos Dias (Assembly of God of the Last Days, Adud) church, whose leader at the time was Pastor Marcos Pereira. This Pentecostal figure, well-known in Rio, is famous for his interventions to stop executions ordered by drug dealers, and also for « invading » funk parties and transforming them into Evangelical services, in order to cast out the demons from the bodies of people attending these events.

48As analyzed earlier, « pacification » as a state strategy is by no means a novelty in Brazil. Seen from a wider viewpoint that goes beyond state practices one could say that « urban pacification » was already being implemented by religious agents in Rio de Janeiro’s peripheries, even before the Rio de Janeiro State Government officially introduced its pacification policy. The same can be said of the actions of organized civil society and their social and cultural projects of peace and citizenship, as discussed above.

  • 17 On the practices of criminal factions in the management of violence, see Feltran (2012).

49It can be perceived, therefore, that by « implanting itself » in the territory, each new state project for confronting violence not only works « on » residents and criminal networks but is also superimposed « on » local actors with particular histories of confronting crime and violence, and their own pacification practices17. The pacification apparatus was no different. Its implementation in the territories disorganized and reorganized already consolidated networks, producing orders and resistances, diluting the legitimacy of local actors and (re)producing other figures of mediation.

  • 18 The Rio Military Police Gospel band, called « Tropa de Louvor » (Praise Squad) in reference to the (...)

50As mentioned earlier, in addition to the « Peace Challenge » sports event, musical performances were also held in Complexo do Alemão in the months following the army’s occupation of the region. The first musical event held there, back in December 2010, a little over a month after the occupation, close to New Year’s Eve, was a service featuring the Rio de Janeiro Military Police’s official band and the Praise Squad gospel band18.They performed with three gospel singers, well known throughout Brazil. I had heard about plans for this « show » towards the end of 2010, but after a while it disappeared from news reports. It seems that the event was downscaled to a smaller project, held inside a police facility rather than outdoors.

51In February 2011, as part of a health campaign run by the Rio de Janeiro State Government, a show by the Brazilian gospel band Diante do Trono was held outdoors in Complexo do Alemão. As I have analyzed in a previous work (Machado 2013), the details of the organization of this show reveal a close alliance between public authorities, private companies and Ngos in the context of the Rio de Janeiro pacification program. Like the « Peace Challenge » sports event, the musical show « Rio Against Dengue » was organized by the AfroReggae Cultural Group.

52Locally formulated in everyday life by small churches and their pastors as face-to-face practices, religious interventions, run by the state as pacifying actions, shaped a large-scale strategy, a symbolic mass operation. The everyday practices of pastors and evangelists, working with families and individuals to propose a route out of crime by joining the church, were overtaken by the spotlights and huge sound systems of a spectacle-based religion that arrives from above and outside. I spent the day of the gospel show in Complexo do Alemão in the company of a pastor from a small Pentecostal church and his family. As he told me that day, he used to be a drug dealer – a well-known one, he eagerly stated numerous times – and became a pastor after being shot in the back and surviving. He was unable to walk and moved around in a wheelchair. He himself was living testimony to this story of conversion, a tale he used to recount emotionally and in detail as his main message. Indeed his injured body was a highly significant part of his testimony. He used to belong to a gang operating in the same locality where he worked as a pastor when we met in 2011, and this was also presented as concrete proof that religion was a potential way out of a life of crime. The pastor’s testimony demonstrated the materiality of his leadership, his body and his territorial presence as both a mode and model of « conversion » for those who, at some critical point of their criminal life, might wish to take a different path.

53As the time of the show approached, I asked the pastor’s wife whether they would be joining us. She looked at me skeptically and explained that they would arrive at the show venue later when only Ministério Diante do Trono would be left to perform. I asked her why and her reply was intriguing : « Everything there is too mixed up ». As I tried to glean a better understanding of her viewpoint by explaining to her how important attending the show was to me, she told me that the symbol of AfroReggae was a raised black fist. In her view, that represented a possible connection between AfroReggae and Afro-Brazilian religion, which was antagonistic to Pentecostal churches in Rio’s public space. It became clear to me that the show was entirely disconnected from everyday religious practices and the religious leaders in Complexo do Alemão, a foreign event organized by unknown people, making its religious legitimacy suspect and an easy target for distrust.

54While the everyday version of religion includes fluid frontiers and transits that form part of a set of quotidian attempts to « convert » people from the world of crime to the world of citizenship, « in the spotlight religion » represents the desire for a one-way « Christian peace ». As a movement from the asfalto to the morro this peace can only be established by the entire population leaving the world of crime (and criminalization) once and for all, and the redemption of an entire territory that would be saved by surrendering to key mediators representing the State and Culture.

55Taking « conversion » in its broadest sense, as a process of transformation from one state to another, from one form to another, or from one objective to another, the process of converting a bandit into a pastor, materialized in his injured and contrite body, can operate as a reference model for a project to « convert » criminalized populations, materialized in their injured and controlled territories. A conversion from crime to citizenship, mediated by powerful religious « weapons » that also adopt the form of government and cultural strategies.

56The question of « culture » is, therefore, a fundamental aspect of the debate on the pacification project in Rio de Janeiro, and the entire history of actions for preventing violence in Rio’s favelas. Thinking primarily through the idea of « cultural policies », it is important to keep in mind the conflictive and political aspects of the production of the concept of « culture », in relation to notions of power and place (Gupta & Ferguson 1997), market and identity (Comaroff & Comaroff 2009), and to always understand culture as a field of dispute. As empirical data, I shall briefly present the way in which the idea of « culture » emerges in AfroReggae’s actions before and after the pacification project. In this process we can highlight the connection between « culture » and « religion » in the context of the pacification policy strategies implemented in Rio de Janeiro.

57Since its creation and earliest projects, AfroReggae has always used « culture » as a « weapon against violence. » Over its more than twenty years of existence, its activities have focused on creating numerous artistic groups in the favelas where it works. In 2001 AfroReggae created the « Urban Connections » project with the specific aim of bringing some of the big names from Brazilian popular music (Mpb) and national pop-rock to perform in the main Rio favelas.

58A musical show under the « Urban Connections » project was held in Complexo do Alemão in 2007, a few months after a police mega-operation to occupy the favela territory. The occupation culminated in a specific day of actions during which nineteen members of the community were killed – the so-called « Chacina do Alemão/Alemão Slaughter ». Unofficial figures indicate that over fifty people died during the police presence in Complexo do Alemão in 2007. This action was carried out in the context of the security strategies for the Pan-American Games held in Rio de Janeiro the same year.

59The gospel show held in 2010 reveals continuities and discontinuities with the 2007 event. One important difference concerns the artists invited to perform at each of the shows. In 2007, one of the singers chosen presented and represented a type of Brazilian popular music enjoyed by the country’s middle and upper middle classes. In 2010, a nationally famous gospel band was invited, more popular among the lower income Brazilian classes. One element of continuity was the staging of a musical show just months after a massive police operation in Complexo do Alemão (2007 and 2010), both of which were organized by the Ngo AfroReggae in partnership with the Rio de Janeiro State Government.

60The slippage of the idea of « culture » in the governance project under way in Rio de Janeiro from a conception of « quality culture » (read : elite culture) to « gospel culture » is highly significant, even more so in the case of a public policy labelled « pacification ». Since colonial times, religion – in particular Catholicism – has been a « moral weapon of pacification » in Brazil. In the contemporary setting, Evangelism appears as a new element in this Brazilian political-religious setting.

61It is interesting to think about the cultural « other » or the « non cultural » other that are rivals in these cultural practices : Funk Music (Facina 2009 and 2014). Allegedly the sound and rhythm of the bandit body and the criminal territory, funk was heavily controlled under the pacification strategies throughout the history of Rio de Janeiro (Facina & Passos 2015). In order to occupy the bodies and territories of favelas, it seemed crucial to replace funk, and if funk was a blend of violence, crime and culture, gospel music was the perfect combination of its opposites : religion, state and culture.

62In Brazil, over the last few years there has been an important debate on the relationship between « culture » and « religion » in the light of the somewhat destabilizing presence of the Evangelists in the national public sphere. While there was once a kind of historical balance between « Brazilian culture », Catholicism and the Afro-Brazilian religions, the presence of the Evangelists has provoked new arrangements and imbalances. In her article, « The “Weapon of Culture” and “Partial Universalisms” », Mafra (2011) analyses the way in which Evangelical groups mobilize the idea of culture, specifically vis-à-vis their relationship to cultural policies in Brazil. The author’s insights into the notion of « culture » have since proved crucial to understanding the relationship between Evangelists and the public and political spheres.

63Following on from Mafra’s insights, in her work Sant’Ana (2013) analyses the controversial case of the legal recognition of « gospel music » as a « cultural manifestation », and therefore officially permitted to receive funding by the Brazilian state, through its laws to encourage culture. At the center of this discussion, relevant national debates have arisen around ideas of « Brazilian cultural diversity », the limits of the meaning of « culture » in Brazilian society, the relationship between culture and religion. There are also disputes around the idea of what a secular state should be and how it should act, the peculiarities of the relationship between « evangelism » and « culture » in building an image of « national culture », and especially the relationship between the evangelical world and the Brazilian « state ». As Sant’Ana (Ibid.) concludes, the « discourse of culture » used to legitimize gospel music is not just an attempt to expand resources to this market, but it is the construction of a recognized space in the national narrative, and an evangelical image, capable of projecting a « cultural » identity that covers a variety of experiences.

64However the connection between « culture » and the « Evangelical world » involves a very specific set of negotiations. One of the less known spaces where these categories come together is the domain of « periphery culture ». There are an increasing number of examples of shows and cultural events organized in peripheral urban territories at which gospel singers and bands share the stage with musicians from the « secular world », grouped under the common banner of « popular artist ».

65« Gospel » is mobilized through governance practices, especially the idea of « periphery culture », which provides the key space that can be exploited by the Ngos in this apparatus : the « secularized » place of the culture of pacification in the peripheries. Thinking about governmentality thus means thinking about the relations between the forms and rationalities of power and the processes of subjectivization – the forming of governable subjects – problematizing questions related to who can govern, what it means to govern, what or who is governed and how this is done (Foucault 1984 [1979]).

66AfroReggae’s relations with the « Evangelical world » have always been controversial. In the field of culture, the Ngo embraced the importance of « gospel music » and a « gospel culture » as part of an idea of « periphery culture ». At that time, AfroReggae was also highlighting the emergence and growth of a new consumer market for gospel culture.

67However, the Ngo’s legitimacy within the Evangelical community was close to zero. As I discussed earlier in this text, AfroReggae’s religious background was linked to « Eastern religions » like Buddhism, while, for its wider audience, its cultural projects were generally associated with Afro-Brazilian religions due to the use of drums and imagery evocative of a generic « African » culture. José Junior, leader of AfroReggae, displays this double belonging on his own body : he has a tattoo of Ogum (an Orisha, an Afro-Brazilian entity) on his right arm, and a tattoo of the Hindu god Shiva on his left.

68The Ngo’s solution to this ambiguity was to invest in locating more suitable mediators for this new work front. One of the most important members of AfroReggae’s staff in 2011-2012 was a former assistant pastor to Marcos Pereira, also a former drug dealer, who abandoned Adud’s ministry and launched a huge arsenal of accusations against the pastor after joining AfroReggae. These were a fundamental dimension of the conflict that emerged between the church and the Ngo, which we will discuss below. Previously united by common goals (conflict mediation and the social rehabilitation of former crime gang members), they became sworn enemies. This former drug dealer and former assistant pastor, who had become the Ngo’s assistant for issues related to the Evangelical world personally shared with me the list of accusations against the pastor that ranged from his association with drug trafficking gangs to sexual abuse cases inside the church.

69During the gospel show at Complexo do Alemão, I met a famous drug dealer’s brother-in-law who was taking care of the dealer’s son and daughter while he and his wife were imprisoned. These teenagers formed a gospel music duo and were performing an opening show at the event. Married to the drug dealer’s sister, a member of Pastor Marcos’s church, this man shared his thoughts and doubts concerning Pastor Marcos’s legitimacy and his intention of becoming part of AfroReggae’s gospel team, which he had already been invited to join. Both figures – the former assistant pastor of a church well-known in the favelas, and the uncle of a famous drug dealer’s children who formed a gospel music duo – fitted AfroReggae’s project perfectly : strong figures mediating between the criminal world, religion, media and politics.

70Drawing from authors like Asad (1993, 2003), Giumbelli (2002), Birman (2003, 2012) and Montero (2012), a « gospel » show organized by a cultural Ngo can be conceived as a process of shaping a specific project to the relationship between the religious and the secular or cultural in Rio de Janeiro. In this project, the idea of a « periphery culture » secularizes the Evangelical performance while the mediation of the non-evangelical Ngo averts any in-depth discussion or controversy concerning the relations between the state and religious institutions, ensuring that lay sensibilities are not offended. As discussed by Asad (1993), the religious and the secular are historically and politically produced and situated in different contexts, and circumstantially marked by specific power relations. In Rio de Janeiro today, Ngos like AfroReggae guarantee the secularism of political partnerships while mediating the secularization of a religious project of a « Christian peace » central to the pacification of the city and its population.

Peace under Threat : Pacification and the Production of Conflicts

  • 19 The 2012 « Peace Challenge » was held in the Rocinha favela. The occupation of Rocinha by the Pacif (...)

71In 2013, however, this peace came under threat. At the « Peace Challenge » sporting event promoted that year these performances of reconciliation were undermined by the shootout that preceded the race, and demanded an analysis of the conflicts visibly present there. In 2011, the « Challenge » took place with the army occupying the territory of Complexo do Alemão. By the 2013 race, the Army had already withdrawn and the military police assumed entire responsibility for policing in the area19. Historically the relation between the favela populations and the military police in Rio de Janeiro has always been turbulent. When the police assumed control of public security in Complexo do Alemão via the Upps, public accounts of conflicts between drug traffickers and residents, on one side, and agents of the state, on the other, increased significantly. It is impossible to state whether these conflicts actually worsened. Based on the sources used in the present analysis, the only certainty is that public reporting of these conflicts increased substantially, along with their visibility. And the shootout that preceded the 2013 « Peace Challenge » was highly visible at the time.

72Various narratives emerged concerning the intentions of criminal factions to make their presence felt through the shots fired that day. In their own way, the Rio drug gang members wanted to take part in the spectacle once again being staged, and demanded their own visibility. The practices involved in Rio’s pacification policy are also performances that produce visibilities and invisibilities. In terms of the official intentions of the policy, the emphasis was on highly visible demonstrations of the State’s power – as in the occupation of Complexo do Alemão. And the criminal factions were expected to vanish.

73It can be noted, however, that the « disappearance » of local drug traffickers is not achieved through their imprisonment, one of the « weaknesses » of the pacification program since its inception. The police forces have made few arrests in the context of pacification. The official argument is that the operation’s central objective is to occupy the territory and engage in community policing, employing these strategies to dismantle the criminal organizations.

74On the other hand, as part of the « choreography of pacification », the criminal gangs in Rio’s pacified favelas turned to less explicit languages to ensure their continued presence. Whereas the Rio drug factions had previously been keen to demonstrate their fire power – pacification led to less ostentatious displays.

  • 20 On the « social policing » of Upps, see Teixeira (2015).

75The State and the police forces also developed new languages and aesthetics to signal their presence in these territories rather than relying on shows of force and violence that had been their preferred language until then. Police officers from the Upps started organizing festive events like collective celebrations of birthday parties for 15-year-old girls in the favelas and baile funk dances, a variety of sports competitions and similar events20.

76After few years of observing the expressions of the pacification policy actions in Rio it was possible to identify a combination of movements performed by state forces, criminal groups and affected populations. In the first act of this choreography, the state played the leading role with its spectacular actions, accompanied by the masking of criminal practices, and the production of strategies of invisibility. These movements unfolded as a feeling of distrust in daily life, in a militarily occupied community where no one knew how to act : neither state officials nor the criminals, not the locals, as the steps were so very discreet and subtle. Esperança (2014) and Menezes (2015) describe this as a time when the police and the criminals were « playing cat and mouse ». Over the years, the state’s leading role has been challenged by the emergence of less subtle and more visible « unpacified performances » These sometimes take the form of overt acts committed by the criminal world, but also actions by popular forces openly denouncing police violence, both of which serve to dismantle the pacification project.

  • 21 The provocative name given to the research project which resulted in the publication of the book Os (...)

77Confrontation and the open display of armed power remained part of the repertoire of the relationship between police officers and drug traffickers. The shootout minutes before the « Peace Challenge » was due to begin is one of these unpacified resources that foreground a frequent question concerning governance in Rio de Janeiro : « Who owns the favela ? »21. And this is without doubt a central question of the performative elements of the « Peace Challenge » in Rio. Who is in control ? Who governs the favela ? The state, the police, drug traffickers, the pastors, the Ngos, the residents ? Whose permission is needed to enter and leave the favela ? Who gives the authorization for events to take place ?

  • 22 Vital da Cunha (2015) discusses how « the fear of the return of fear » is one of the analytical ele (...)

78Within the logic of the confrontation between the police and traffickers, the shootout was interpreted as the traffickers’ reaction to pacification. In response, the Rio de Janeiro Secretary of Public Security, who was participating in the race, stressed the project’s strength and unswerving continuity in his interviews22.

79Another possible narrative circulated as a rumor, unreported in the mass media : the local drug gangs wanted to « send a message » not (only) to the state agents, but to AfroReggae. While the activities organized by the Ngo had previously been well received in the community, following its explicit close alliance with the state authorities and police forces, its events were no longer welcomed in the area.

80As explained earlier in the article, the Ngo AfroReggae historically built up its public position by presenting itself as a legitimate mediator of conflicts between favela residents, leaders of criminal factions and state agents. However this sensitive position required a very precise stance from its leaders, especially its head, José Junior. The increasingly close relations between AfroReggae and figures from Rio’s public security sphere, including their appearance in the territories side-by-side with representatives of the state policy, may have been responsible for destructuring their old and already well-established partnerships with local residents, especially the drug traffickers.

81This sensitive issue regarding the potential « contamination » of local agents by their proximity to state practices can also be observed in the experience of other cultural groups. Facina and Passos’s work on funk parties (Facina & Passos 2015) explores the fact that these parties, understood by the state agents as a relevant aspect of the criminal governance of the gangs, were immediately banned from the favela territory following pacification. The first funk parties that took place after police occupation were organized by police officers from Upps and held under their control. After some years of pacification, the Rio de Janeiro State Culture Secretary selected various funk projects in order to provide them financial support to organize funk parties in the favelas, circumventing the need for drug trafficking money. In their work, Facina and Passos show how cultural groups from Complexo do Alemão that received state support to organize funk parties were still heavily controlled by the police, and also faced some degree of suspicion from the local population.

82Two months after the shootout that preceded the « Peace Challenge », in July 2013, a fire broke out at the head office of AfroReggae in Complexo do Alemão. The version of events presented by the leader of the Ngo was that local drug traffickers had set fire to the premises at Pastor Marcos Pereira’s behest. In the mass media, the conflict focused on the Ngo and the pastor in question (Machado 2016). As already described earlier, AfroReggae’s leader pressed charges against Pastor Marcos Pereira in 2012, accusing him of sexual abuse and criminal association with drug trafficking gangs. In 2013, the pastor was arrested, sentenced and imprisoned for sexual abuse. In December 2014 he was released, and returned to his position as head of his church. Several aspects of the criminal trial against Pastor Marcos were obscure, from his accusation to his defense. Both the leader of the church and the Ngo were suspected of mishandling facts related to the case. Both lost some of their already fragile legitimacy as a result.

83However, we can also draw other conclusions from this apparent opposition between Ngos and churches in « pacified » territories in Rio de Janeiro. While the mediation between residents, leaders of local crime factions and state agents was already an important question for Ngos and churches prior to « pacification », the events related here – and others observed during fieldwork – confirm that this mediation remains fundamental after pacification. The 2011 « Peace Challenge » race was only viable through the dynamic equilibrium generated by its organization. But the 2013 event was already an alteration to this supposed equilibrium. The organization of an event of this type and magnitude demonstrated the Ngo’s new position in the field of tensions constituting Rio’s political sphere. The race’s goal was to celebrate and legitimize the entry of state forces into the territory of Complexo do Alemão. And while in 2011 this act, to a certain extent, demonstrated the Ngo’s power of mediation, in 2013 it also revealed its limits and its depletion after several years of the pacification project.

84In 2012, after the arson attack on the Ngo’s head office, AfroReggae announced the cessation of its activities in Complexo do Alemão. The 2013 « Peace Challenge » the year of the shootout, was the last time the event was held. The Ngo was forced to restructure some of its activities, adopting another kind of relationship to the pacified territories, especially Complexo do Alemão.

85After the highly mediatized conflict between the Ngo and Pastor Marcos Pereira worsened, the church experienced a decline in its legitimacy within the religious and political arena. Adud lost ground during its pastor’s absence and it was only after his release that the church began to rebuild some of its religious and political legitimacy, albeit now without the autonomy it had before, leaving it far more dependent on larger actors from the religious and political spheres.

86Despite the numerous controversies surrounding the Ngo and the pastor in question, the residents of Complexo do Alemão nonetheless lost historically well-established interlocutors who had circulated and worked in this territory, developing activities seen as important and legitimate by a significant portion of the local population. Perhaps it is even fair to say that the public controversies that projected these leaders from the world of culture and religion into the territory of distrust and loss of legitimacy were largely due to their excessively close relationship to the practices and reasoning of the State. This above all undermined their positions as mediators of local forms of resistance achieved at specific moments of their trajectories.

87The Rio « pacification » produced new conflicts in the favela territories. As a result of the everyday presence (through community policing) of police officers in the locality, local alliances were substantially reorganized. Before pacification, the relations with drug traffickers provided the grounds for dialogue and mediations in daily life. After pacification, the police also became part of this everyday life and the particular arrangements of this coexistence provoked new tensions like those described in this paper. Prior to pacification, the urban (political and territorial) space of the favelas favored the alliances forged by Ngos and local churches. After pacification and the new proximity to the public authorities, these connections became exhausted and redefined. When the state « won back » the territory, Ngos and churches lost symbolic ground in some favelas. Moreover criminalized and marginalized populations lose significantly from the decline of their relationships with these rare partner institutions, historically important to confronting the forms of violence that affect them on an everyday basis.

  • 23 See Gaius Barretto Briso, « Menino morto ao ser baleado no Alemão adorava a escola e esperava “um f (...)

88In 2015, the boy Eduardo de Jesus Ferreira, ten years old, was killed by a bullet to the head while he was playing with a mobile phone in the doorway of his house in Complexo do Alemão23. Soon after his death, residents from Alemão denounced Eduardo’s execution by military police operating in the locality. In November 2015 the police officers’ responsibility was confirmed. They claimed it was an act of « legitimate self-defense ».

89Eduardo’s death became a symbol of the residents of Complexo do Alemão’s fight against police violence, and a denunciation of its continuation under the pacification policy. In April, soon after Eduardo’s death, José Junior, the leader of AfroReggae, commented on the incident on his Facebook page :

« According to information, this boy was a bandido [gangster]. If so, he could well have killed a police officer if he had got the chance. The question is who is winning with this war ? Entire families are torn apart. Some of the armed factions of Complexo do Alemão and other favelas co-opt boys and girls to work for them ».

90As described above, this Ngo had been born out of the 1993 Vigário Geral Slaughter. Twenty-three years later, its leader publicly sought to justify the death of a child, making the same arguments used to defend the police practice of exterminating the population of Rio’s favelas.

91More than a formal partnership to organize sporting and cultural events within the context of the Rio pacification project, the Ngo has become a civil ally central in the state’s pacification program. Moreover this alliance operates far beyond festive events : it is reinforced by every photo of the Ngo leader with the Secretary of Public Security, the State Governor, a police officer. It is evident in comments on Facebook, in the Ngo’s presence at cultural events organized by the Rio elite, in the media material produced by the Ngo, broadcast on national Tv and in its presence on popular Tv programs expressing support for police practices. On every occasion the Ngo is represented by its leader, José Junior.

Final Considerations : Pacification as a Policy of Dissociation, not Only Occupation

92A key element of Rio de Janeiro’s pacification policy is the dissociative potential of state practices that impact the residents’ own creative strategies for protection and resistance, by influencing local social relations and partnerships established over decades in Rio’s favelas. While we might hastily conclude that the state presence offers favela residents an alternative regime of protection, careful long-term research demonstrates that this « dissociation » is a goal in itself, and its consequences are simply further vulnerability and exposure of this population to state violence.

93The policy also provides a remarkable insight into how this dissociative power functions : it does not derive from police control and violence, which might be expected to have the opposite effect of increasing the associative dimension of the favela’s social life as a means of developing forms of resistance. Indeed this was the instigation for many local civil actions against any kind of violence, regardless of who the perpetrators were. But this dissociative strategy emerges through various local, collective social actors, usually the best known, who are won over as « partners » in state projects, preferably those related to culture and sport, and are thus distanced from their alliances on the ground with the favela population.

94The state’s most powerful dissociative action is not the use of force, but lies in the economic power to support social initiatives and projects and the moral strategy of building alliances focusing on specific actions. Gradually, different local actors of varying sizes, from the smallest to the biggest, somehow forged connections to the web of resources provided by the state through « calls for proposals » and « partnerships ». These « resources » offered not only material, but also symbolic, support. Slowly, almost every organization bore the « stamp » of a government partnership. The state brand has expanded through myriad local actions and actors, and this association has dissolved some of these initiatives : several groups became too big to be able to connect to the « ground », as their focus shifted to large-scale actions and interventions. Their decline is the result of a detachment from social reality and a delegitimization in the eyes of local actors with whom they first established their alliances and bonds of trust.

95Another relevant aspect of the state’s dissociative presence is the continual competition it creates between social actors struggling for political space and funding. It exacerbates the conflicts between agents that used to work in partnership with each other but are now contenders for state government approbation. This feeds into the reality of the crossfire situation of the favelas.

  • 24 See Alexandre Rodrigue, « O rei das Ongs está no AfroReggae », Revista Exame, 2 March 2013 [http:// (...)

96Over the past nine to ten years, the Cultural Group, AfroReggae, consolidated its position in Rio de Janeiro as the State Government’s main partner for the organization of social and cultural events. Afroreggae was involved in almost all the State funded projects during this period. Examples of this can be found in various fields : health, citizenship, human rights, justice, public safety, and culture. In 2013, a famous Brazilian business magazine released a report on the leader of AfroReggae entitled « The King of Ngos is in AfroReggae »24. According to this report, in 2012, the organization raised 20 million reais (9773200 Usd) for its 40 social projects. The funds came from banks, private and public companies, as well as Rio de Janeiro’s municipal and state governments. AfroReggae also created it’s own brand « AR » to sell its products and in 2013 the Ngo had 350 employees.

  • 25 The title of public utility to entities, civil foundations or associations means government recogni (...)

97From 2000 to 2013, Pastor Marcos Pereira was a key figure of the political arena in Rio de Janeiro. For many years he had open access to state prisons where he held religious services and celebrations. Marcos Pereira was officially called upon several times to end rebellions in state prisons mainly in Rio, but also in other states of Brazil. His church was attended by councilors, state and federal legislators, and senators. The church’s rehabilitation service was recognized as a « public utility » by the government of Rio de Janeiro in 200925. In 2012, Pastor Marcos Pereira’s church members and singers enthusiastically participated in the celebration of the first anniversary of the existence of a particular Upp in Rio, publicly confirming the partnership between the police unit and the church’s rehabilitation service.

98To highlight just one specific case, the Ngo AfroReggae and the Adud church are good examples of the analysis proposed here : the actions of both these organizations are initiated by the concrete reality and suffering of the people living in the peripheries. At some point these organizations’ paths intersect and they work for a while in partnership. They develop rapidly through an involvement in state actions, but this generally brings them into conflict. As a result, their original activities and involvement in the local area decline, and they lose their legitimacy with their peers.

99Performances of pacification shape operations that act as an apparatus combining military control of the territory, actions that shape the ideal models of citizen bodies, and moral policies for the redemption of sinful souls. This complex ensemble creates a highly resilient web that captures subjectivities, not only by restricting individual movements and collective actions, but also by offering models that seem innovative, spontaneous and liberating. Ultimately however, the increased interaction between these models entangles them in a mesh of complexities. Returning here to the idea of a choreography of pacification, we can say that movements become pre-defined and marked and so instead of promoting new moves they immobilize local actors through a network that distances them and diminishes their legitimacy, reducing the capacity for spontaneity, liveliness and improvisations.

100The Rio pacification model emerges therefore, in my analysis, as a civil-military system, mobilized by a diverse set of forces and composed by state, civil and religions agents. The relationships between these actors, I conclude, reorganizes – or, to put it more aptly – disorganizes the local alliances upon which they impose themselves. This pacification strategy thus aims to produce conflicts, disagreements and disarticulations. It is designed to reconfigure the social life of the favelas, banishing from the territory not only (or not precisely) criminal groups, but various actors of civil society, such as the Cultural Group and the church analyzed here. It allows the preferential and sometimes exclusive circulation of specific actors : police forces responsible for controlling the life of the people and new groups from outside that do not have a historical relationship with the populations and territories, although they are given the responsibility of, and the necessary funding to develop « pacifying » actions. The alliances that emerge erode the everyday solidarities that constitute the resistance of the social fabric and seek to induce ruptures between social actors. The latter distance themselves from the populations living in these territories, seeking instead the illusion of partnerships with the public authorities.

101But the strength of the resistance is never exhausted. Every day in various peripheral territories in Rio de Janeiro, new groups are organized, new cultural collectives arise, sparkling with enthusiasm and hungry for original and revolutionary actions. Religious leaders rise up against the injustice and suffering experienced by people attending their churches. Social projects and Ngos evolve new strategies for their operations in their continuous fight for citizenship and human rights. And from all this, new moves, new steps are invented every day, not to enhance a choreography of pacification, of order, but to dare to add new and unprecedented steps to the lasting choreography of resistance.

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Notes

1 See « Complexo do Alemão » [www.riomaissocial.org/territorios/complexo-do-alemao/].

2 It is important to note that the data on favelas in Rio de Janeiro are very controversial. The Complexo do Alemão population, for example, is estimated by some at over ninety thousand, and information about the size of the territory it occupies ranges from 450000 to 1700000 square meters.

3 Various studies have been undertaken in Rio de Janeiro on the pacification policy. I highlight the Dossiê Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora-Cevis, edited in two volumes by Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva (2014 and 2015) in Revista Dilemas. This publication provides a detailed appraisal of the practices implemented by Upps police officers over the eight years of the pacification project in Rio de Janeiro, exploring the topic from a wide variety of perspectives : police practices, representations in the mass media, sociability in the favelas, and so on.

4 See Tahiane Stochero, « Para Exército, ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que guerra e missão no Haiti », 15 August 2012 [http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/para-exercito-ocupar-alemao-e-mais-dificil-que-guerra-e-missao-no-haiti.html].

5 On the Army’s period of occupation in Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro, see the works by Esperança (2014) and Gonçalves (2014).

6 Cf. Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora [http://www.upprj.com/index.php/faq].

7 An extensive literature in the Brazilian Social Sciences has made hard-hitting critiques of this model of criminalization of the poor in Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil generally. Among these works we can highlight : Zaluar (1985), Zaluar & Alvito (1998) ; Valladares (2005) ; Machado da Silva (2008) ; Rocha (2013).

8 The disappearance of the bricklayer Amarildo in the Rocinha favela in July 2013, who vanished after he was stopped by police officers from the local Upp and taken to the unit’s base, became a political symbol of the denunciations of the continuation of police violence in Upp areas. The slogan « Where is Amarildo » was chanted at numerous public demonstrations protesting against state violence. Amarildo’s body was never found.

9 See Observatório de Segurança Pública [www.observatoriodeseguranca.org/seguranca/pronasci].

10 See Vladimir Platonow, « Programa Território de Paz será lançado no Complexo do Alemão » [http://memoria.ebc.com.br/agenciabrasil/noticia/2008-12-04/programa-territorio-de-paz-sera-lancado-no-complexo-do-alemao].

11 The idea of mediation formulated by Latour (1997 [1979], 2001) proposes that the work of mediation, through its creation of linkages, modifies the « original » interface elements. By focusing attentively on mediations, the focus shifts from terms to relations and the productivity and creativity of mediated relations and their mediators.

12 See AfroReggae, « Visão & Manifesto » [http://www.afroreggae.org/visao-manifesto/].

13 Stating that the image of Rio’s civil police is « less » associated with violence in no way implies that this association is entirely absent. Together with Bope (Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police’s Special Operations Battalion), the elite team of the civil police, named Core (Coordenadoria de Recursos Especiais/Special Resources Coordination Team), is present in many of the « special operations » coordinated by the Public Security Office of the Rio de Janeiro State Government. The image of the Rio Civil Police is also closely entwined with the militia forces (milicias) active in the state.

14 Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police’s Special Operations Battalion (Bope).

15 I discuss the « religious » here inspired by the debate on the genealogy of religion and the diverse formations of the secular, as explored by Asad (1993, 2003), and discussed by Giumbelli (2002), Birman (2003, 2012) and Monteiro (2012), among others, in relation to Brazil. In terms of the broader set of questions raised by these researchers, I share their emphasis on analyzing the historical and political conditions for the construction of the categories « religious » and « secular », the implication of the latter in modernist ideologies and projects, and their adaptation to the specific contexts of nation states.

16 Jon Blair, Dancing With the Devil, 2009 [http://dancingwiththedevilthemovie.com/].

17 On the practices of criminal factions in the management of violence, see Feltran (2012).

18 The Rio Military Police Gospel band, called « Tropa de Louvor » (Praise Squad) in reference to the international hit movie Tropa de Elite (released in English as Elite Squad), was a social project run by Bope, a special police unit of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro State. The band emerged from the Bope Evangelical Congregation, whose services were held in the police force headquarters. Bope is a « special operations unit » renowned for its aggressive and often lethal interventions in urban conflicts in Rio, especially in favelas. Some days after the occupation of several different favelas by police and military forces as part of the pacification project, which had included a typically violent use of force by Bope, the Praise Squad held a church service at the community police unit’s base. I attended some of their performances in various churches and police institutions as part of my fieldwork, but never inside a favela.

19 The 2012 « Peace Challenge » was held in the Rocinha favela. The occupation of Rocinha by the Pacification Forces took place in November 2011 and, as in Complexo do Alemão, the « Peace Challenge » was held in the area two months after occupation.

20 On the « social policing » of Upps, see Teixeira (2015).

21 The provocative name given to the research project which resulted in the publication of the book Os donos do morro. Uma avaliação exploratória dos impactos das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (Upps) no Rio de Janeiro, edited by Cano, Borges & Ribeiro (2012), draws attention to the role that police play in these territories, wrongly going far beyond merely ensuring the population’s security.

22 Vital da Cunha (2015) discusses how « the fear of the return of fear » is one of the analytical elements central to the continuity of Rio’s pacification project and its sustainability.

23 See Gaius Barretto Briso, « Menino morto ao ser baleado no Alemão adorava a escola e esperava “um futuro bonito” », O Globo, 4 April 2015 [http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/menino-morto-ao-ser-baleado-no-alemao-adorava-escola-esperava-um-futuro-bonito-15780855#ixzz4LeN0TfsS].

24 See Alexandre Rodrigue, « O rei das Ongs está no AfroReggae », Revista Exame, 2 March 2013 [http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-exame/edicoes/1036/noticias/o-rei-das-ongs].

25 The title of public utility to entities, civil foundations or associations means government recognition that these institutions function in accordance with its social objective, are non-profit and community service providers

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Carly Machado

Universidade federal rural do Rio de JaneiroDepartemento de cienciâs sociais, Rio de Janeiro (Brésil)

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